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Book Reviews
InternationalHumanitarianAssistance, by Peter Macalister-Smith.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985. xiv and 244 pp. US $45.00.
ISBN 90-247-2993-9.
The Right to Life in InternationalLaw, ed. by B.G. Ramcharan.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985. xii and 371 pp. US $57.50.
ISBN 90-247-2074-0.
The Right to Food,ed. by P. Alston and K. Tomasevski. Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.228 pp. US $36.50. ISBN 90-247-3087-2.
When the international community first became interested in the
problem of human rights during the second world war and then
enunciated those rights in a series of international instruments, there was
a tendency among writers to deal with the issue as a comprehensive
whole. Now, however, it has become increasingly popular for authors to
deal with a specific right to the exclusion of all others.
Dr. Macalister-Smith has taken as his subject the question of "disaster
relief actions in international law and organization," a matter which, at
least on the level of morality, antedates any of the treaty recognitions of
human rights. Moreover, a study of the classical writers, such as Grotius
and Vattel, shows that in the 17th and 18th centuries, there was much
awareness of a duty under the law of God or natural law. Not
surprisingly, the author devotes attention to the need for relief during
armed conflict, with particular attention to the work of the Red Cross,
but in addition to this he reminds us, in chapter 5, that the -humanitarian
activities of the Red Cross go far beyond this. Article 5 of the
Constitution of the League of Red Cross Societies in fact imposes the
obligation "to bring relief by all available means to all disaster victims"
(p. 80). But the League is not an official or inter-governmental body and
what is of more interest, therefore, is the manner in which states may be
under an obligation to come to the assistance of disaster victims, disasters
being "emergency situations in which there is an urgent need for
international assistance to relieve human suffering" (p. 3). Such disasters
may be natural, ag., earthquakes, floods, famine; or man-made, as during
armed conflict or as a result of such accidents as those at Bhopal and
Chernobyl. However, it is perhaps playing with semantics to suggest that
"so-called 'natural' disasters are mis-named essentially because they
include a component which reflects mankind's relationship with the
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environment. This is increasingly demonstrated as more people become
vulnerable to the effects of natural phenomena" (p. 3).
According to Dr. Macalister-Smith, the drive for international
humanitarian assistance in the event of disaster springs from the idea that
"if the desire to maintain security and develop peaceful relations is the
primary motivation of international law, the instrumentalities of
cooperation serve to link the realization of this ideal with measures
designed to promote the interests of individual people" (p. 5). The chief
"instrumentality" for this purpose is, of course, the United Nations,
whose work on behalf of refugees is perhaps the best known of its
humanitarian activities and is rightly considered a response to disaster,
both natural and man-made (c. 3). Equally, in a very generic sense, the
activities in the field of human rights at large may contribute to assistance
in disaster situations, although it must be remembered that, in the absence
of a treaty, there is no legal obligation upon any state to afford asylum or
hospitality to a refugee or the victim of any disaster. Nevertheless, none
of the human rights instruments pays sufficient attention to the fact that
the basic fundamental right, namely that of life, "is threatened by the
consequences of disasters" (p. 64). It is interesting in this connection to
note that none of the essays in the volume on The Right to Life in
InternationalLaw is concerned with this particular threat to life. Life is
clearly dependent on health, food, medical care and the like, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasise this. However, one
might question Dr. Macalister-Smith's suggestion that this "guarantee" in
any way imposes anything in the nature of an obligation - even moral
- to ensure that such necessities ae available to any person outside one's
own national borders, despite the fact that Article 11 of the Covenant
calls,for international cooperation to ensure freedom from hunger "taking
into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting
countries" (p. 65). Producing states, nevertheless, do not hesitate to

destroy supplies which may be of fundamental value in feeding the
hungry, when failure to destroy might debase prices and profits.
While one may have every sympathy with the difficulties of an
economic or similar character facing the developing countries, it is
suggested that it is too simple to accept the assertion that "[t]he urgency
of the conditions facing many of the developing countries makes it
difficult for them to realize all the rights of the Universal Declaration [of
Human Rights]. The need to guarantee subsistence to their populations
has served to justify for the government of some developing countries the
application of relatively permanent restrictions on civil rights and
liberties" (p. 66). We cannot overlook the fact that the Universal
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Declaration was the product of a relatively small group of somewhat
like-minded states with a similar approach to the problem. It is perhaps
time that we abandoned the idea that there is any acknowledgement of
a Universal Declaration, but this does not excuse attempts to explain
away political fears of human rights by reference to underdevelopment.
Increasingly, -we are seeing instances of acts by more powerful states
that tend to be justified in the name of humanitarian intervention, a
concept which is by no means universally accepted, and which involves
"intervention by force in the name of humanity against a State in order
to protect the fundamental human rights of the citizens of that State, the
latter being unable or unwilling to do so itself" (p. 69). The author
questions the legal validity of such a claim, maintaining that "a
convincing application of the doctrine requires a high standard of nonintervention to be maintained in ordinary international intercourse,
including in some cases of pressing need" (p. 72). One problem is that
humanitarian activity by an outside state may easily be affected by and
provide the ideological cover for political pressure. In view of this it may
often be better, at least for public purposes, to rely on the activities of the
Red Cross movement (c. 5), although even these are now subject to
political pressures that may often override their humanitarian purpose.
Insofar as organized international humanitarian activity is concerned, we
find the same political pressures present when examining the role of the
United Nations and its specialized agencies and organs, although when
faced with natural disasters the Secretary-General has shown a "readiness
...to assist in coordination, and also to be at the disposal of nongovernmental organizations concerned with relief," although many might
consider the budget at his disposal for this purpose somewhat minimal
(p. 95). While one cannot ignore the role of such organizations as the
World Health Organization (pp. 105-6) or UNICEF (pp. 99-100), it
may well be that the efforts undertaken by the European Economic
Community consequent upon the Lome Convention (pp. 111-115) and
by non-governmental organizations (pp. 117-121) are often more
productive.
Dr. Macalister-Smith is among those, like the reviewer, who recognize
that in many ways human rights and humanitarian law are more
respected and protected during armed conflict, with the Geneva law
constituting a major factor to this end. "The extension of such a body of
law to the area of humanitarian needs arising in peacetime disasters
would require a high degree of international commitment by States,
which so far has been forthcoming only to a slight extend. Compared to
the humanitarian law of armed conflict, efforts to develop parallel law in
time of peace have been inadequate and have yielded disappointing
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results" (p. 163). Perhaps it is time we sought to revive some of the
concepts of natural law propounded in this field by Vattel and Pufendorf.
The aim of intervention in the name of humanity is the preservation of
human life, and the collection of essays edited by Dr. Ramcharan is
concerned with various problems relating to the right to life in
international law, with the editor pointing out that "in discussion of the
rights to life, care is needed as to whether one is discussing its nature and
meaning under a particular international convention, or whether one is
referring to the concept in general international law. It may be considered
that, based on international practice, the provisions of national
constitutions and various international instruments, the 'right to life' is a
norm of international customary law or a general principle of
international law which transcends particular statements of the right in
specific international conventions. In examining the nature and meaning
of the concept, as a part of general international law, one... must have
recourse to the totality of the evidence and the practice available within
the international community" (p. 3). While this sounds impressive, it is

submitted that it says absolutely nothing of the meaning of the "right to
life" in international law, and it matters little from a practical point of
view that the General Assembly or the Human Rights Commission or
Committee have passed Resolutions or issued comments proclaiming the
fundamental importance of this right, especially as it is difficult to
ascertain its content, as is clear from Dr. Ramcharan's analysis of this
(pp. 4-27).
To a great extent the essays in the collection do not really expand on
what is meant by the right to life. For the main part they seem to express
broad political concepts, relating to issues which may be regarded as lifethreatening. Thus, Dr. Tokhonov of the Institute of State and Law of the
USSR deals with the inter-relationship between the right to life and the
right to peace (pp. 97-113), while Professor Kuper of UCLA is
concerned with genocide and mass killings (pp. 114-9) and Professor
Weissbrodt of Minnesota considers international measures against
arbitrary or summary killings by governments (pp. 297-314). He
deplores the way in which international bodies tend to criticise such
killings but conclude that nothing can be done. His proposal reflects
idealism, but is not necessarily one that states are likely to pursue: "At
minimum, international organizations ought to insist that governments
pursue the normal procedures they routinely follow in determining the
cause of death - even in the army or other governmental entities. There
may also be need for elaboration of international norms as to what
constitutes an adequate inquest or official investigation of death. In
addition, perpetrators should be brought to justice and families
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compensated. Governments should provide training and take other
measures to help ensure that arbitrary or summary killings do not occur"
(p. 307). This comment is reminiscent of the attitude adopted by a "civil
war-prone" country during the discussions leading to the adoption of
Protocol II 1977, when its senior delegate ridiculed the suggestion that his
government should be expected to teach potential rebels their protective
rights so that the government's effort to suppress the rebellion might be
limited. Nevertheless, his paper should be read in conjunction with that
of Professor Gormleym who writes on the right to life and the rule of
non-derogability: peremptory norms of jus cogens (pp. 120-59). While
he maintains that the right to life, including "the right to living", is
covered byjus cogens, he concedes "that an attempt is being made to give
effect to human rights protection by a norm that has not been clearly
defined. Moreover, there is relatively little agreement as to the rubrics
that are included within the higher norm of jus cogens. Although the
norm does in fact exist, ...it is far from certain what areas of human
rights are included. Beyond question, the right to life enjoys the
preeminent position within the hierarchy of law. Similarly, the right to
life is a right erga omnes. But it must be conceded, both rights lack a
clearly defined scope" (p. 147).
Other aspects of the problem are considered from the point of view of
survival requirements (Menghistu, 63-83); its inter-relationship with the
right to development (De Waart, 84-95); the obligations to "respect" and
to "ensure" the right to life (Kabaalioglu, 160-81); protection by law
(Redelbach, 182-220); arbitrary deprivation (Boyle, 221-44, Nsereko,
245-83); while Dr. Sapienza is concerned with international legal
standards of capital punishment (pp. 284-96). He points out that it is
difficult for international law to deal with this topic since states habitually
consider it a matter of criminal and therefore domestic jurisdiction, while
the moral and political aspects tend to put the issue outside a truly legal
framework (p. 284). It must not be forgotten, however, that various
international instruments concerning human rights have sought to abolish
capital punishment by treaty (pp. 291-2, 343) while Amnesty
International has made abolition an article of faith. The attitude of states
towards this matter, however, illustrates how far practice frequently is
from both agitation and even black-letter law.
While the authors of The Right to Life in InternationalLaw have
ignored the issue ipsa verba (although Menghistu and De Waart touch
upon it), the contributors to the collection edited by Alston and
Tomasevski are aware that life depends in the first instance on the right
to food. This "right" was the topic of a conference at Utrecht in 1984
convened with the assistance of the Netherlands Ministry of
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Development Cooperation. The Conference was held to coincide with
the end of the decade which had been foreseen by the 1974 Rome World
Food Conference as culminating in "no child [going] to bed hungry, no
family [fearing] for the next day's bread, and no human being's future and
capacities [being] stunted by malnutrition" (p. 7). We have gone beyond
that decade and there are probably now more people below the
starvation level than there were when the Rome Conference proclaimed
this high hope.
Historians of international law will recall that many of the "fathers"
asserted that there was a basic right to food, and that those states which
"had" were under an obligation to give to those which "had not". The
cartoon on page 168 showing a "coloured" military officer standing by as
a "white" entrepreneur presents a starving "coloured" child with a load
of armaments, stating, in reply to the question "vous n'auriez pas quelque
chose Amanger?", "Tenez! Qa va passer!", may be a cynical comment on
political reality. Nevertheless, it is perhaps indicative of what the "have"
states think of any contention, however convincingly it may be argued and the addresses at the Utrecht Conference were convincing - that
there is right to food. Equally telling is the mere mention of the various
food "mountains" maintained in Europe and the United States. It is
perhaps even more cynical to remark that "the right to food of detained
persons, prisoners of war, children and handicapped people is relatively
straightforward" (p. 49). This comment supports the contention of the

reviewer that respect for human rights is more real under the law of
armed conflict than at any other time.
L.C. Green
University of Alberta
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Le droit dans tous ses etats. La question du droit au Quibec 1970198 7. Collectif des sciences juridiques de 'UQAM sous la direction
de Robert D. Bureau et Pierre Mackay (Montreal: Wilson &
Lafleur, 1987) pp. 620.
This book contains 30 essays covering many aspects of Quebec law,'
divided into five sections: l'Etat, les personnes, les conditions de vie, les
organisations, and a final section entitled l'&mergence d'une science
juridique. The contributions are united in a formal sense in two ways:
their authors are all professors in the department of sciences juridiques at
l'Universit6 du Quebec i Montreal, and they all focus on developments
in the period 1970-1987. Thematically, the pieces are united, according
to the preface at any rate, in providing, "une lecture critique de
l'6volution des tendances de notre droit" during this agitated, exhilarating
and troubled period. Readers with only a passing familiarity with the
Quebec legal scene should be warned that reading this book is rather like
taking your first ten-countries-in-fourteen-days tour of Europe: you may
not be able to tell a Romanesque cathedral from a Gothic one when you
return, but at least you will know which areas you want to revisit in order
to explore them at leisure.
Le droit dans tous ses dtats is a remarkable achievement in many ways.
It is difficult to think of any other law faculty in Canada which could
have produced a collective work of this kind, involving virtually all fulltime members of the department. This suggests that the professors at
UQAM's department of sciences juridiques, well known for its insistence
on collective forms of student participation in legal education, really do
practice what they preach. The fact that a certain amount of institutional
self-promotion accompanies this effort - the volume was released to
coincide with the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the department
- does not detract from its significance.
Even more impressive than the bare numbers of faculty involved,
however, is the shared commitment to the cause of the less powerful and
marginalized elements of society: workers, women, refugees, tenants,
welfare recipients. It is this clear identification with those who are and
have been disadvantaged by the law that makes this volume so refreshing
in the context of our legal scholarship, traditionally couched in terms of
neutrality and "point-of-viewlessness". Given that there are about 20 law
schools in Canada committed to an ideal of professional/academic
"excellence" which implicitly or explicitly supports the societal status
1. There are some contributions on constitutional law, and a few on areas of federal law such
as criminal law and immigration.
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quo, we desperately need UQAM to maintain its alternative vision,
which is rooted in a popular critique of law and a popular and
progressive agenda for social change. I admit I was relieved to see that,
at least at the level of published work, UQAM has managed to retain
some of the spirit which motivated its foundation in 1972, and this in
spite of the shift to the right which has become so apparent in the last
decade or so.
The main theoretical preoccupation of most of the essays in the
volume's first four sections is, unsurprisingly, the role of the state in the
production and administration of law. Theorizing about the relationship
between state and law has been a major preoccupation of legal and
political theorists in the West for the last two decades, growing out of the
assaults on the legitimacy of both institutions during the 1960s. In
Quebec, however, this crisis of legitimacy has been delayed until very
recently. The rapid modernization of Quebec society which occurred
during the Quiet Revolution was accomplished largely through the
agency of the state, investing it with a high degree of legitimacy during a
period of rapid economic growth. Then, as that very process of
modernization provoked a crisis in Quebec culture which led to a
renewed form of nationalism, the state emerged once again as the vehicle
for the safeguarding of Quebec's culture and the French language, and
the promotion of her aims within Canada and the world. The social
legislation passed by the Parti Qub&ois during its first few years in
power appealed to a broad spectrum of progressive and nationalist
opinion, at a time when governments in Canada and elsewhere had
begun to pare down the welfare state and to "free" the market.
But by 1982 or thereabouts the bloom was off the rose. Inevitably, as
the government of Quebec moved to tighten its budget following the
recession of 1981-82, massive confrontations arose. The enormous battles
over the public servants' collective agreement in 1982 may be the best
example of the disillusionment with the state which was now beginning
to characterize the post-referendum era. The "crisis of legitimacy" was
about to hit, and hit hard. Many of the contributors to this volume are
still reeling from it, and cast a jaundiced eye over both the past and the
future. The subtitles illustrate this in striking fashion: "Droit penal et
sexualit6: un pas en avant, deux pas en arri~re", "L'Ugalit6 des femmes en
mati~re d'emploi: rien n'est acquis", "La protection des droits des usagers
du syst~me de sant6 au Quebec: diagnostic inquirtant, pronostic reserve,
and so on. Even the gains of the past are revealed as at best limited, at
worst illusory. Robert Bureau can agree with Ralph Miliband that in
spite of certain reforms,
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1'tat resta ce qu'il avait tourjours , c'est-A-dire le partenaire du monde
capitaliste dans le maintien des structures de proprit, de privilege et de
pouvoir existants,
et dans la lutte contre toute atteinte r~elle A ces
2
structures.

Meanwhile, the rapid advance of neo-conservative policies and ideologies
under the Bourassa (and Mulroney) government(s) seems to threaten the
preservation of those aspects of the existing system which truly
represented advances for the working class and the poor.
Where do we go from here? For most of the contributors, the
prognosis is indeed "guarded". Robert Bureau, in the opening
contribution to the volume, is one of the few to suggest briefly where the
way forward might lie:
Si on ne peut plus s'appuyer sur l'Etat qui pourrait bien nous renvoyer A
nos familles, aux institutions privres et A nous-m~mes, il y a lieu de
s'interroger sur de nouvelles formes de solidarit6 et un nouveau type de
contrat social qui pourraient offrir aux femmes et aux hommes d'ici un
module alternatif de dimocratie que les gauches traditionnelles, aussi
grnreuses aient-elles pu avoir &6,mais le plus souvent dogmatiques et
sectaires, n'ontjamais rrussi Aproposer en 6change
He gives as precedents the formation of community health clinics and
legal clinics during the 1970s, which were run by citizens' groups without
state intervention until they were later absorbed by the bureaucratic
tentacles of the welfare state. The transformation of "les gauches
traditionnelles" by a potential "rainbow coalition" of groups representing
women, native peoples, immigrants, the elderly, ecologists and peace
workers, is also seen as a hopeful sign.
In other words, one should not simply fall into the trap of trying to
turn back the clock, by attempting to foist back on the state those
functions which it is currently trying to jettison. Rather, we should try to
organize as users of various goods and services, in order to exercise our
collective power directly against producers in the marketplace, rather
than indirectly through urging the state to regulate the market. Implicit in
this about-face is a return to private law, and away from a public law
redolent of bureaucracy, alienation and disempowerment. Claude
Thomasset provides a glimpse of how a revitalized private law might play
a role in the area of housing, with a form of collective bargaining, centred
on private contracts, operating between producers and consumers of
housing. 4 Speculation about the future, however, is almost entirely absent
from this volume; except for the last section, which is about law as a
2. At3.
3. At10.
4. "Le logement, entre l'ttat et 1'entreprise: gen se d'un droit en devenir", at 245.
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discipline, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the past. Given the
extraordinary changes which Quebec has undergone in the last few
decades, this is perhaps not surprising. Still, there is a burgeoning
literature in English that examines, criticizes and attempts to reformulate
the traditional distinction between public and private which is so crucial
to liberal legal discourse, and it is a pity that the authors seem not to be
familiar with it. While I am not suggesting that there is "an answer" to
this question, perusal of this literature might have helped the authors to
provide a more nuanced analysis at times.5
There are a few criticisms of a general nature I would make before
looking at some of the best essays in more detail. They fall into two
categories: the nature of the theoretical framework(s) employed and the
coverage of the volume.
This is indeed a work "lourd de convictions", as Dean R.A.
Macdonald of McGill observes in his preface to the volume. But
convictions are not always enough: it is crucial that they be
complemented by rigorous theoretical analysis and a solid grounding in
empirical reality. Some of the essays herein are very sophisticated
theoretically, but several are quite disappointing in their failure to deliver
the "lecture critique" promised in the foreword. Two essays on family
law, one on company law and one on the development of accident
compensation regimes merely chronicle legislative developments during
the period in question, with little or no attempt at critical analysis.
I found Ren6e Joyal's contribution "La famille, entre l'clatement et le
renouveau" especially disappointing in this regard, given the importance
of the feminist critique of the family and family law over the past two
decades. She finds it "normal et plut6t r6confortant" that Quebec law
now recognizes the juridical equality of the spouses and accords greater
respect to the rights of children, and seems prepared to treat these paper
gains as representing some corresponding improvement in the real world.
While passing reference is made to the plight of "les families monoparentales 6conomiquement defavoris6es" which are mostly femaleheaded, there is no indication that reforms of divorce law and
matrimonial regimes may actually have exacerbated this social
phenomenon, as recent work by Lenore Weitzman 6 and Mary Jane
Mossman 7 has tended to suggest. As well, she adopts a textbook
5. See, eg., N.E. Simmonds, "The changing face of private law: doctrinal categories and the
regulatory state" (1982), 2 Legal Studies 257 and the symposium contained in (1982), 130
Pennsylvania L. Rev. 1289-1609.
6. The Divorce Revolution (New York: Free Press, 1985).
7. Mary Jane Mossman and Morag MacLean, "Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward a
New Equality" (1986), 5 Can. J. Family Law 79. For a more sanguine view of matrimonial

956 The Dalhousie Law Journal

definition of family law which allows her to exclude any reference to
domestic violence, surely one of the most contentious issues in "family
law", broadly understood, over the last two decades.
In this context, I was surprised at the paucity of explicit feminist
critiques of law in this volume. While one does not sense that the
contributors would be hostile to such a perspective, the fact remains that
only two essays out of 30 explicitly adopt a feminist critique: Lucie
Lamarche's survey of pay (in)equality and sexual harassment in the
workplace, and Johanne Doucet'and Lucie Lemonde's study of sexuality
and criminal law. Only eight of 30 contributors are women, and the
concept of class dominates the analytical framework almost to the
exclusion of gender. Thus the important gender implications of the
reform of social assistance law, for example, are left totally unexplored in
Yves B6langer's analysis of the topic. Similarly, Jean-Serge Masse breaks
down by sex the statistics on complaints regarding breaches of the duty
of fair representation by unions, but gives only the bare figures: 85
per cent male, 15 per cent female. Even given the low overall success
rate, I was still left wondering whether such complaints by women
against largely male unions would be treated as seriously as complaints
by men.
The Joyal essay is by no means alone in its tendency to treat the
traditional categories of legal thought as somehow self-justifying and selfdefining. While lawyers trained in the common law are certainly guilty
of this sin as well, it seems to me that civilian modes of legal thought are
especially prone to it, precisely because they are more informed by the
dictates of rationality than the common law. Persons, the family,
obligations, property - all have their separate books in the Civil Code,
all are more or less watertight as legal classifications. Likewise, the
distinction between public law and private law is seen as unproblematic
- indeed, one is hired to teach either droit public or droit priv6 in a
Quebec law school, and I always get puzzled glances from colleagues in
Quebec when I tell them I teach Property and Administrative Law! I find
it ironic that some of the essays in this volume remind us clearly and
forcefully that legal ordering should be seen as only one facet of the
whole process of normativity which characterises any society. Yet the
received pattern of norms within the legal universe itself seems to have
gone unquestioned in the parcelling out of essay topics.
As for those essays which are more explicitly "critical" in their
analysis, a number suffer from a failure to articulate clearly and
property law in Quebec, see Monique Charlebois, "Quebec Family Property Law: In Need of
Reform", in E.D. Pask et at, eds., Women, the Law and the Economy (Toronto: Butterworths
1985).
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rigorously their theoretical points de depart. Simple references to "social
control" will not do: we need to know the locus of control, its purposes,
its exact manifestations and the identity of those being controlled. In
Maryse Grandbois' essay, "Le droit et l'environnement: un couple
paradoxal", for example, we are told three times in two pages that "[l]es
territoires vou6s la conservation deviennent &la fois espaces de loisirs,
espaces de contr6le social et espaces 6tatiques", but the author does not
elaborate on these themes. She rightly observes that protecting wildlife
and natural regions has become a federal-provincial battleground, that
"protective" legislation is all too easily set aside when economic
development is at stake, and that such legislation is deficient in terms of
the mechanisms provided for public participation. Yet how exactly do
these factors relate to the social control thesis, or prove that these natural
regions are perceived as "espaces 6tatiques", whatever they may be, by
those who enjoy them? The ideas are tantalizing, but until they are
fleshed out they remain assertions rather than arguments.
Passing from legal theory to legal practice, I was surprised at the lack
of empirical analysis or socio-legal work in this collection, but this is
more of an observation than a criticism. There is really only one
contribution that adopts a quantitative methodology in order to
determine the effectiveness of a particular legal reform, and that is JeanSerge Masse's study of the duty of fair representation of union members,
added to the Quebec Labour Code in 1977, which I mentioned earlier.
His quite surprising results show once again that there is a world of
difference between the law in books and the law in action, and remind
us just how narrow our preoccupations have been in the legal academy
until recently.
A number of contributions to the first section of the volume - L'Etat
- deal with the CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms, and I must
say I found them disappointing and interesting at the same time:
disappointing because they seemed to be content with pointing out that
the Charteris based on a liberal theory of individual rights, raising the
spectre of legal continentalism, and suggesting that the adoption of the
Charteris going to make the struggle for social justice more difficult.
Well, yes - all these observations may contain more than a grain of
truth. But if one accepts them as the truth, then of course they become
self-fulfilling prophecies. I was interested to see that this was the UQAM
"line" on the Charter,though, because it differs considerably from the
way my colleagues and I at Dalhousie discuss the Charter.We admit that
the liberal rights discourse is of course an important aspect of the Charter,
and potentially a trap, but we tend to stress the recognition in the Charter
of various cultural collectivities and group rights. Aboriginal rights,
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minority language education rights and language rights in general, are
conferred on collectivities rather than individuals as such. The
recognition of affirmative action and multi-culturalism also denotes the
importance of group rights. The constitutional affirmation of equalization
payments (technically, outside the Charter) and limitations on mobility
rights recognize the importance of regionalism in the Canadian context,
while Section 1 - the very first section in the Charter!- recognizes that
individual rights exist only in a social context. We thus tend to reject
Pierre Mackay's analysis that the Charter simply makes Canada an
American constitutional law colony instead of a British one. One doesn't
have to look far in the Charter (the preamble and section 1 would
probably be far enough) to realize that it is a heterodox document from
both the British and American viewpoints. In other words, it is classically,
irrevocably and unmistakeably Canadian. It is not merely liberal, it is
certainly not neo-liberal, and it may even be post-liberal if we are lucky.
The irony is that the Charter would almost certainly not be as
"communitarian" as it is without Quebec's historic contribution to the
Canadian Confederation. So why do these professors at UQAM see the
Charter only as an American-style Bill of Rights? I find this most
perplexing, and can only speculate as to why it should be so. Perhaps it
is "simply" the political context: given that the Charterwas foisted on
Quebec against its will, I should hardly expect nationalist intellectuals at
the people's law school to be in the vanguard of the Chartermanic
cheering section. 3 Dorval Brunelle, in a cogently argued essay, goes so far
as to suggest that the ConstitutionAct of 1982 was engineered specifically
to create the necessary juridico-social climate to soften us all up for the
whole neo-liberal agenda of privatisation, deregulation and anti-welfare
statism. 9 Apparently, Trudeau dreamed up this master plan as the
recession settled in over 1981-82, and set up the Macdonald Commission
on the Economy to legitimate this dramatic reorientation in policymaking.
Now I like conspiracy theory as much as the next academic, and I am
quite prepared to attribute the most Machiavellian of motives to our
former Prime Minister, but there are limits... Something along the lines
of the ConstitutionAct 198.2 had been a pet project of Trudeau's since his
political debut, and it was the disarray of his opponents after May 1980,
coupled with the realization that not even he could be Prime Minister
forever, that impelled him in 1981-82. His views on economic policy
8. Yet Pierre Mackay, while deploring the Americanization of our constitutional law, lauds the
Canadian Charter for providing much more effective protection against arbitrary state action
than the Quebec Charter, which can be easily circumvented by the government of the day.
9. The authors use the terms neo-liberal and neo-conservative interchangeably in this volume.
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might well have been changing at this time, but the most that could be
said is that the Constitution Act 1982 might be compatible with those
new views, not that it was a necessary condition of their actualisation.
While we are on this topic of neo-liberal economic policy and the
Charter, is it true to say, as all the authors seem to assume, that "la
reconnaissance l~gale des droits et libert~s civiles ... contribue h la
marginalisation des revendications collectives et sociales"? The fact is that
the Charter does not -

yet -

protect economic interests directly;

property is not included, explicitly or implicitly, in s. 710 It is worth
recalling that the multi-national drug companies fought a pitched battle
on both the judicial and the legislative fronts to have restored to them the
patent rights which the Trudeau government had restricted in 1969. They
succeeded only on the legislative front; all their Charterarguments were
thrown out in the Federal Court."1 Admittedly, economic regulation is
now more difficult to enforce given s. 8, but I suppose I can accept that
even corporations should enjoy some kind of due process where search
and seizure is concerned. Much more troublesome, admittedly, are the
victories won by corporations in their offensive to emasculate unions via
the Charter. I am far from convinced, however, that this trend will
continue. Now that labour knows that management is playing Charter
hardball, it will undoubtedly develop its batting strength. And we have
not even begun to explore how the notion of "security of the person"
might be used to promote "les revendications sociales" rather than retard
them.
One last observation on this Charterbusiness. Could it be that the
contributors regard the Charteras enshrining only the values of liberal
individualism because they genuinely do not see anything else in it? What
I mean is something like the following. We in English Canada have
actually made some progress in the last few decades in discovering/
creating a national identify for ourselves. There are certain concepts,
values, themes, modes of expression that we now identify as Canadian or rather, "distinctively Canadian", because of our old insecurity about
"Canadian" being undistinctive by definition (is anything ever
"distinctively Spanish" or "distinctively Burmese"?). 12 We now recognize
10. A Conservative backbencher's motion calling for constitutional entrenchment of property
rights was adopted by the House of Commons on 2 May 1988: The Gazette (Montreal), 3 May
1988, p. B-1.
11. Smith, Kline & French LaboratoriesLtd v. A.-G. Canada (1986), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 584
(EC.A.), upholding (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (T.D.).
12. I do not mean to suggest that there is an overwhelming consensus on what constitutes the
national identify of English Canada. In a country as regionally divided as Canada, one would
have to admit the possibility of at least five distinct English-Canadian identities: British
Columbia, Prairie, Ontario, Maritime and Newfoundland. The earlier prophets of the
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these traits when we encounter them, whether in conversation, poetry,
landscape architecture or constitutional documents. But you had to be
there. Quebec was engaged, during this time period, in its own struggle,
re-interpreting its own national identify. The idea that "English" Canada
might have its own "national" identity is to this day a foreign one in
Quebec. Qurb6cois thus do not recognize the elements in the cultural
matrix which we in the rest of Canada have agreed to constitute as our
national identity; when confronted with individual elements in the
matrix, a Qurb~cois would probably label them as American or British.
We are just beginning, in the late 1980s, to surmount these barriers to
comprehension, but until we have progressed further the type of
discourse that we have in English Canada about the Charter will be
largely unintelligible in Quebec.
A final general criticism relates to the coverage of the volume. There
are three sins of omission here, two mortal and one venial. How a volume
subtitled "La question du droit au Qu6bec 1970-1987" can be produced
without a single paragraph devoted to the language question I find
extremely puzzling. Is everyone simply tired of it now? Is there such a
consensus among the francophone community about the desirability of
the measures now in place that the subject is not worth discussing?
Whatever the answer, the omission is extremely disappointing. Equally
disappointing was the lack of any contribution on the genesis and impact
of the James Bay Agreement on the legal position of native peoples in
Quebec. Politically, legally and socially, the James Bay Agreement was
innovatory, and the alleged failure of the Quebec government to respect
it remains a matter of controversy in 1988. In a volume which attempts
to cover the "progressive waterfront", as it were, the omission of any
13
material on the native peoples is noticeable and startling.
The final sin of omission is less important. I found it odd that the
reform of the governance of the professions initiated via the Professional
Code was overlooked. 14 Professionals are among the most powerful
groups in any modern society, and techniques for rendering them
accountable among the most problematic. I would have been interested
Canadian identify such as Northrop Frye have recently been criticized as too Laurentian, in
that they ignore important aspects of the Western and Eastern Canadian experience. See Janice
Kulyk Keefer, Under Eastern Eyes: A Critical Reading of Maritime Fiction (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1987), 18-32. Yet this whole debate merely illustrates that the fact
of an English-Canadian identity is now taken as a given.
13. The omission is not quite total: Katherine Lippel includes a brief account of the 1981
paramilitary operation launched by the Quebec Government against the Micmac of
Restigouche over alleged abuse of salmon fishing rights, in her essay in the practice of public
interest law in Quebec.
14. R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-26.
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to discover whether the structures created by the Code, unique in
Canada, have in fact rendered the professions more accountable, or
whether their prestige and power has merely been enhanced and
legitimized.
Turning from the general to the particular, let me identify those essays
which I think deserve a wide audience. Given the number of
contributions, I cannot even promise to discuss all those which in my
opinion fall in that category. Faced with such an embarras de choix, I
have decided to single out two essays which I found exceptionally
stimulating, and'then mention more summarily a half-dozen others which
might be of particular interest to readers outside Quebec.
Carol Jobin's essay, "Gestion de conflits, loi de processivit6 et
mentalit6 qu~bcoise. Essai de r6flexion sur les r6formes des institutions
qu6b6coises d'administration du Code du travail (1969-1985)" promises
much and delivers more. It is essentially an analysis of the Quebec legal
psyche as seen through the prism of labour relations law, and a hardhitting, unflinching analysis it is.In a sentence, the thesis is that all parties
involved in the labour relations system in Quebec - lawyers,
administrative decision-makers and judges, perhaps even clients - share
an excessively adversarial attitude to legal process which engenders
delays, inefficiency, high costs and poor decisions, and ensures that any
structural reforms are consigned in advance to ineffectiveness. He
suggests that this is a peculiarly Qu6b6cois affliction, and his most telling
piece of evidence here comes from the mouth of the then vice-president
of the Canada Labour Relations Board, Brian Keller. In an unreported
decision quoted in the text, Mr. Keller observed that "labour relations in
the Province of Quebec appears to be more legalistic and adversarial than
in any of the other provinces", and that "a typical case [Le, before the
C.L.R.B.] will take 50 per cent longer in Quebec than elsewhere ...
because [of] a total absence of cooperation between the parties prior to
and during a hearing". 15
Another aspect of this legal environment which further retards
progress in labour relations is what Jobin calls "le culte de la diff6rence",
which demands that "nous nous fabriquons des choses diff&entes pour
rrgler des situations qui sont pourtant souvent semblables Acelles qui
vivent nos voisins nord-amrricains". 16 Thus the necessity to create an
institutional structure which is fragmented, complex and overly
dependent on curial rather than administrative procedures.
If the latter point is easily comprehensible - indeed, does English
Canada not at times suffer from its own culte de la difference vis-i-vis the
15. At 408.
16. At 414.
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United States? - the former is less so, and, if true, a matter of urgent
investigation by comparative lawyers, historians and sociologists on both
sides of the Ottawa River. First of all, does this "loi de processivit" afflict
only labour relations, or does it characterize Quebec legal culture as a
whole? Impressionistic evidence from my own research in Quebec law
suggests that litigants in ordinary civil cases are likely to experience
inordinate delays which to my knowledge do not occur in other
provinces. Take for example a few private law cases from Quebec which
reached the Supreme Court of Canada in the early 1980s:
Soucisse v. NationalBank of Canada
trial judgment 1970; appeal judgment 1976; appeal heard in S.C.C. December
198017

Senez v. MontrealReal EstateBoard
action launched November 1971; date of trial judgment unknown; appeal
judgment April 1979; appeal heard in S.C.C. April 198018
Rubis v. GrayRocks Inn Ltd
cause of action arose August 1964; date of trial judgement unknown; appeal
judgment 1975; appeal heard in S.C.C. March 198119
The last-named case must mark some kind of record in Canadian
jurisprudence: the plaintiff was 4-years-old when the accident in question
happened, and old enough to prosecute the action in her own name as a
legal adult by the time the appeal finally reached the Supreme Court of
Canada! This is admittedly a small sample but very few cases of "pure"
Quebec civil law reach the Supreme Court. What is more to the point,
a random search revealed no cases from common law provinces which
had suffered such delays.
If this "processivit' is indeed a hallmark of Quebec legal culture in
general, then a search for its origins is imperative. Jobin himself has little
to say on this except to speculate (tongue in cheek?) that it may result
from "un atavisme insondable tenant i des racines latines interdisant une
approche rationnelle des conflits" (!) He cannot really be saying that the
French, Italians, or Brazilians are incapable of resolving disputes in a
rational fashion... can he? In the area of labour relations in particular,
one may wonder whether the inauguration of the collective bargaining
system under the Duplessis regime may have created a deep-rooted
cynicism about the whole process which poisoned later efforts to reform

17. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 339.
18. [1980] 2 S.C.R. 555.
19. [1982] 1 S.C.R. 452. These are presumably "pathological" rather than "natural" or
"inherent" delays: see Y-M Morissette, "Les lenteurs de lajustice consid&res sous un angle qui
les avantage" (1987), 33 McGill L.J. 137.
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it. At any rate, a few doctoral theses on this topic would be most
welcome.
Jobin's usage of federal decision-makers administering federal law in
all the provinces, as sources of evidence for investigating the different
legal cultures in Canada, illustrates both its potential effectiveness and its
inexplicable under-utilization to date by legal researchers. In this case it
also reveals a poignant irony. The traditional distinction made by
Canadian historians between French Catholic corporatists and English
Protestant liberals seems to be reversed here, with the Quebec
participants acting like caricatures of possessive individualists and the
English Canadians like model corporatists. 20 Whether the historians are
wrong, or whether there is an important disjunction between Quebec's
legal and non-legal cultures, or whether Jobin's portrait itself partakes too
much of caricature, remains a matter for further research.
Jean-Marie Fecteau's essay "I'histoire du droit dans le champ du
savoir: l6gitimation et contradiction disciplinaire" is the first in the final
section of the book, "L'mergence d'une science juridique", which is by
far the strongest of the five sections. All five essays in this section are
excellent: stimulating, reflective, informative, lucid and vigorous in
expression; if I single out Fecteau's, it is only because legal history is one
of my own preoccupations, and because Fecteau's observations are
particularly welcome in this crucial formative period of Canadian legal
historical studies.
In a dozen pages Fecteau gives us a brief tour d'horizon of the themes
and methods of Quebec legal history to date, then proceeds to reflect on
the constitution (reconstitution?) of legal history as an autonomous field
of academic activity in recent years. He observes that every field of
knowledge "induit une dynamique de ldgitimation qui fonde la
pertinence de l'entreprise tout en justifiant son cadre d'opfration", and
notes that legal history is characterized by a "processus particulirement
puissant d'autonomisation qui tend i en faire davantage une 'branche' du
droit qu'une dimension d'un savoir grndral sur la soci6t". Thus, legal
history is automatically legitimated insofar as it is parasitic upon the
formal legal world of lawyers, courts, legislatures, legal treatises, etc.
Fecteau does not note, but is presumably aware, that this tendency is
confirmed and accelerated by the eagerness with which actors in the
20. I am setting up an historical straw man here which, to a certain extent, has been battered
by more recent work: see, eg., S.F Wise, "Liberal Consensus or Ideological BattlegroundSome Reflections on the Hartz Thesis", [1974] Canadian Historical Association Historical
Papers,1. Yet the battering has taken the form of exploring the strong Tory communitarian
streak in English-Canadian "liberalism", more than the liberal-individualist components of the
French-Canadian experience.
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formal legal world seek to have their own legitimacy enhanced by legal
historical studies devoted to them. Thus the Law Society of Upper
Canada establishes the Osgoode Society for the furtherance of work in
Canadian legal history; Ontario's Attorney-General Roy McMurtry is
acknowledged to have been an important promoter of the Society.
Judges provide forewords to collections such as Law in a Colonial
Society: the Nova Scotia Experience.2 This latter practice must surely be
the last manifestation of the patronage system to be found anywhere in
the academic world of the late 20th century. The Prince of Wales is no
longer asked to provide prefaces to collections of essays on, say, life in
18th-century England, nor does the president of Mobil Corporation
display his imprimatur in books on energy policy. Traditions of deference
are apparently alive and well in the legal world, however. 22
This "automatic legitimation" bears a heavy price tag: the isolation of
legal history from other disciplines, and the reinforcement of strong
positivist tendencies within the discipline itself. Or, as Fecteau succinctly
puts it: "ce qui est en jeu est non seulement l'autonomie du champ de
recherche, mais l'objet d'&ude lui-m~me." What should this object be?
Once again, I can do no better than quote Fecteau. Legal history will
only come into its own as a true social science, he says, when it
cessera d'etre histoire du droitpour devenir interrogation fondamentale sur
l'6volution des diff&ents modes de normalisation qui assurent la rgulation
fragile des soci6t~s humaines, quand, en somme, son point central de
r6f~rence sera non pas une institution historiquement sp6cifi6e, mais un
questionnement particulier sur une des dimensions constitutives de
l'existence sociale.
The only refinement I would suggest here is that one can never consign
law to being "just another" means of imposing norms, because it is the
very decision to use the law - as opposed to religion, community
opinion or propaganda, for example - to create and enforce norms
which is often of interest to the historian. The "law-ness" of the law is a
fundamental aspect of Western culture which cannot be wished away or
ignored in the quest to make legal history part of a "savoir g~n&al sur la
soci6t". I suspect that this is merely a difference of emphasis between us,
rather than any overt disagreement.
21. (Toronto: Carswell, 1984), and (1984), 8 Dalhousie L.J.
22. And not altogether absent from this volume. Why would it be necessary to have the Dean
of Law at McGill provide a preface to a work of this kind? Is this supposed to increase sales?
Induce people to read the book who would otherwise have dismissed it as the product of the
loony left at UQAM? Does it suggest that the McGill Law Faculty or its Dean has some
especial pre-eminence to comment on works of this kind?
For another recent example of this kind, see D.P. Jones and A.S. de Villars, Principlesof
AdministrativeLaw (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) (foreword by H.W.R. Wade).
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Fecteau clearly realizes that we need to know what legal norms were
at a given historical moment before we can compare them to social
norms and reflect on the broader process of normativity itself. But he
encourages us never to treat the investigation of legal norms as an end in
itself. Implicitly, he chides us for our arrogance - I speak of lawyer legal
historians here - in assuming that legal norms are self-justifying and selfdefining topics of inquiry, inherently more "worthwhile" or "necessary"
or "important" than, say, the attitudes of Micmacs toward the Acadians
in the 17th century, or the role of women in the Methodist Church in
19th-century Canada. No wonder our colleagues in other departments
get annoyed with us. This essay, in translation if necessary, should be the
first item on the syllabus of all legal history courses taught in Canada
from now on. It will certainly appear there on mine.
As I mentioned, the other essays in the book's final section are also
excellent. Ren6 Laperrire's "A la recherche de la science juridique", one
would not guess from the title, is a trenchant and well-reasoned critique
of the Arthurs Report's views (or lack thereof) on the goals of legal
science and the fundamentals of law. Until I read this essay I had not
realized that no representatives from Carleton's Law Department or
UQAM's sciences juridiques were invited to sit on the Consultative
Committee, a fact which speaks volumes in and of itself. Pierrrt
P6ladeau's "Essai de definition mrthodologique d'une recherche
juridique sur la problmatique informatique, pouvoirs et libert&' is a
model of the kind of rigorous attention to methodology which is taken
for granted in good sociological work but very under-developed in
Canadian legal scholarship. I was pleased to see references in this piece
to work in the first volume of the Canadian Journal of Law and Society,
which suggests that this new journal may be a fruitful point of contact for
work from Quebec and English Canada. English-Canadian sociologists
of law will be extremely grateful to Guy Rocher for his "La sociologie du
droit au Quebec: une nouvelle discipline en 6mergence?", which provides
a critical and comprehensive look at the development of the field in
Quebec, its themes and methods, and suggestions as to where it is headed.
The final essay in the volume, Katherine Lippel's "Les pratiques
alternatives du droit", is in a class by itself. It provides an inventory and
analysis of various political-action-through-law campaigns, from the
Micmac response to "la guerre du saumon" of 1981, to the civil
disobedience of welfare recipients whose heating was cut off in the winter
of 1977, to class actions alleging human rights abuses launched by
inmates of Archambault Penitentiary. As an informative and thoughtful
primer on radical lawyering, Quebec-style, this essay could hardly be
bettered. It made me realize how crucial it is to have someone who is
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involved in these developments, devote the time to chronicling and
reflecting on them, and making the results accessible through publication.
As it is, these campaigns receive a few columns in the popular press, if
that, and survive only in the oral culture of a small coterie of lawyers in
a particular community. As Lippel observes: "Pas 6tonnant qu'il y ait peu
d'crits l -dessus, les gens qui auraient quelque chose dire n'ont pas le
temps d'6crire." Perhaps one of the provincial law societies will launch a
well-funded society to help further the study and practice of radical
lawyering in Canada.
So much for the book's final section. I would be remiss, however, if I
did not point out a few essays elsewhere in the volume which I found
particularly meritorious. Pierre Robert has contributed a strong critique
of the criminal law work of the Canada Law Reform Commission,
arguing that the absence of any fundamental philosophy of penal reform
has allowed the Commission to be "captured" by the state in order to
legitimate its own discourse on penology. "La Charte et la s~curit6
nationale" has nothing to do with the Charter(Canada's or Qu6bec's),
but Ga~tan Nadeau provides a good, and frightening, overview of an area
often ignored by Canadian legal academics (did the McDonald
Commission really report that it suspected the R.C.M.P. of having
engineered a murder?).
Normand Marion takes up the same theme, inter alia, in "Le droit
p6nal Al'&re n6o-lib~rale: le danger crolt avec son usage", and argues that
most criminal law reforms of late are preoccupied with reducing costs
and increasing efficiency. This seems to be the case with corrections
reforms, as prison inmates join the ranks of the de-institutionalized:
psychiatric patients, the handicapped, the homeless. The thesis seems to
be difficult to reconcile, however, with the vastly increased police budgets
of recent years, which Marion indicates constitute two thirds of the cost
of the entire penal system. It is in the interests of the police to portray the
"amount" of crime as constantly increasing - in particular, the "war on
drugs" must be fought on ever more numerous fronts against criminals
whose ingenuity mutates exponentially from year to year, rather like
mosquitoes becoming immune to DDT. All, of course, requiring more
and more resources devoted to police work.23 Are we really getting more
bang for our buck? Happily for the police, it is impossible to tell. The
point is simply that the police and the state cannot be assigned a total
congruence of interests, as Marion seems to do. Finally, Katherine
Lippel's second contribution to this volume contains some fruitful
23. See, eg., RV. Ericson et at, "Punishing for Profit: Reflections on the Revival of
Privatization in Corrections" (1987), 29 Can. J. of Criminology 355.
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analysis of recent changes in workers' compensation, ominous in its
suggestion that the 1985 Act is based on a new philosophy of income
security similar to that upon which social welfare benefits are based,
rather than a philosophy which considers the injured worker as the
creditor of an insurance scheme.
If the department of sciences juridiques at UQAM wished to make a
splash on the Canadian legal academic scene with this volume, I think it
can fairly be said to have done so. I cannot think of a single law faculty
in Canada which would not be proud to have produced such a volume.
Particularly in the book's closing section, the contributors have given us
much to reflect on - and by "us" I mean anyone interested in the law,
right across Canada. If we have not already done so, it is high time that
we - the "established" (establishment?) law schools - started including
UQAM (and Carleton, but that is another story) in our mailing lists,
inviting its faculty to conferences, having them as guest professors, and
going there on sabbaticals (if they want us).
If the overall tone of this volume is somewhat sombre, we might do
well to remember its final sentence, penned by Katherine Lippel:
II y a quelque chose i faire avec le droit, Acondition qu' on ne permette
pas au droit de faire quelque chose avec nous.
Professor P. Girard
Dalhousie Law School
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InternationalLaw and the Developing Countries, by R.P. Anand.
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987. Pp.xii, 274. £ 48.00.
Professor Anand over the past two-and-a-half decades has established
himself as one of the leading Third World publicists of international law.
Less rhetorical than some, but just as vigorous, he has championed the
development of a new international law based on cooperation in
rejection of the old traditional and "Eurocentric" international law. In
InternationalLaw and the Developing CountriesProfessor Anand brings
together a collection of his previously published essays and wields them
into a book for the purpose of evaluating "the traditional law and the
process of change that it is undergoing to become a communal law of
mankind".
The first two essays are pure history. The first concerns the impact of
history on the literature of international law, though the essay in its latter
part makes little attempt to distinguish between the impact of history on
international law in contrast to its impact on the literature. The second
essay is concerned with the development of the law of the sea in South
East Asia. Both essays are characteristic Anand: always interesting,
sometimes provocative, and often enriching. Both essays rely on
Alexandrowicz's pioneering work though, unfortunately, both were
written before Gong's onslaught on Alexandrowicz so we do not possess
Anand's view. One suspects that he would well agree with Gong.
In three essays the primary thrust is economic. The first is concerned
with the establishment of a New International Economic Order. The
second is concerned with the role of the General Assembly in bringing
about a fairer distribution of the world's resources and the third raises the
question of how the southern hemisphere can reach a level of economic
order comparable to that enjoyed by the northern without bringing
ecological disaster upon all. These essays constitute the heart of the book.
Two essays on the law of the sea follow. The first traces the
development of fishing zones in international law and considers the
extent to which they may provide a solution to the shortage of protein in
the Third World. Somewhat surprisingly, given his grasp of history,
Anand fails to expressly point out that the concept of fishing zones for
conservation purposes is exceedingly old: Welwood at the turn of the
17th century argued for such a zone on the basis that the Dutch fishermen
had exhausted the herring fishery off the east coast of Scotland. The
second essay looks at the development of the concept of mid-ocean
archipelagoes, a concept the orgination and development of which may
justly be attributed to the Third World.

International Law and the Developing Countries

Concluding the collection is an interesting analysis of proposals in
respect of an international police force and interposed between the essays
of a historical nature and those concerned with the economic world order
is a very helpful analysis and summary of that most troublesome of
concepts, sovereignty and its practical application in the world today.
The golden thread running through the essays is what Anand perceives
as the historical inevitability of an international law based upon the
principle of cooperation with the elimination, ultimately, of poverty in
international society. In arguing this thesis Anand avoids the natural
temptation of succumbing to sentimentalism and he recognises the
difficult challenges such a re-orientation presents to the existing world
order. Pragmatic as always, he rests his case ultimately on the need to
avoid confrontation and tension between rich and poor nations in an
interdependent world overshadowed by the threat of nuclear holocaust.
As pragmatic as his arguments may appear, he fails to face many of
rocks upon which noble principles may break, and indeed his arguments
throw up sharp edges which cut deep into his views. For instance, he
points to the declining returns on raw materials produced by Third
World states as an example of the unfair treatment of the Third World
but fails to note that the falling real prices of food stuffs and raw materials
is a world-wide problem from which many sectors of the economies of
industralised states have suffered. Also, he rightly points to the affluent
West's excessive use of raw materials and the pollution industrialisation
has created. Yet he urges the industrialisation of the globe, and as an
antidote to the horror which he leaves us feeling must result from such a
course concludes, and in no more detail, that "International lawyers
should develop a law of cooperation and co-ordination in this field".
More importantly, however, he fails to face up to the question of cost
to the industralised world if the type of world he desires is to come to
pass. Recognising the intractable tendency of human nature towards
selfishness, and its capacity to feed upon rather than shun bitterness, he
fails to recognise that the achievement of his aspirations will require a
more inspiring call to mankind that the emotionless and somewhat
formless principle of cooperation. World-wide disaster may otherwise
face us, but that has not prevented the arms race. Reason alone is not
enough.
Finally, one must comment on the presentation of the work. Professor
Anand has not been well served by at least one of his publishers, printers
or proofreaders. Elementary errors abound and are too numerous to list.
Particularly atrocious, though, is the spelling of "Welwood" as
"Elswood" and the failure to ensure that each page is paginated. For a

970 The Dalhousie Law Journal

book of its retail price and length, and considering the fact that the essays
were already in publishable form, these failings are worthy of censure.
Nevertheless, InternationalLaw and the DevelopingCountriesremains
a useful systematic presentation of the thoughts of one of the developing
world's leading publicists on an issue of interest to every international
lawyer.
Jeremy Thomas, LL.B. (Lond.), LL.M. (Dalhousie)
Barrister of Gray's Inn
Research Associate, Dalhousie Law School.

Constitutional Law (Kempo)

ConstitutionalLaw (kempo), by Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, translated
into German by Robert Heuser and Yamasaki Kazuaki. Original
title in German: Verfassungsrecht (kempo), Schriftenreihe
Japanisches Recht Vol. 21. Kln-Bonn-Miinchen: Carl Heymanns
Verlag, 1986. 348 pp.
In 1976 Carl Heymanns Verlag published the first volume of a series on
Japanese law. A recent addition to this collection covering areas as
diverse as civil and criminal procedure, labor law, nuclear energy law,
and international law, is Miyazawa Toshiyoshi's (1899-1976) book on
constitutional law. With this German translation, Robert Heuser and
Yamasaki Kazuaki provide their readers with the first systematical
overview on Japanese constitutional law in a western language.
Their choice was an appropriate one since, as Heuser points out in the
introduction to the translation, Miyazawa's book is Japan's most widely
used textbook on constitutional law. Its first edition was published as
early as 1949, only two years after the entry into force of Japan's postwar constitution. As one of the most influential experts on constitutional
law in his country, Miyazawa was among those invited to take part in the
deliberations on the new constitution. This experience and insight, as well
as Miyazawa's visits to Europe and North America, are mirrored in the
author's concise account of Japan's constitutional history and in the
chapters dealing with the constitution of 1947.
A main feature of the book is that it is an introduction to both
constitutional principles in general and Japanese constitutional law in
particular. In fact, it uses the former to make the latter accessible to the
reader. In each section of his study Miyazawa gives an overview of
relevant historical aspects as well as various possible constitutional
approaches before he describes the path chosen by the Japanese
constitution. This serves to elucidate the extent to which the present
constitution is a synthesis of Japan's own constitutional experience, its
openess to well-established models in France, Germany and the United
States, and the striving for compatibility between Japanese tradition and
the needs of a modern society.
Before highlighting Japan's constitutional history, Miyazawa analyses
basic elements of constitutional law, such as the notions of "state",
"people" and "sovereignty". Only after sketching the major steps in the
development of constitutionalism in Europe and North America does he
proceed to outline the evolution of Japan's political system from an
extremely hierarchical society headed by a God-like Emperor (tenno) to
the adoption of the first Japanese constitution in 1889 (Meyi
constitution). Showing parallels with the content and purpose of the
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German constitution of the time, Miyazawa explains how the Megi
constitution was designed to accommodate some liberal ideas while
preserving the imperial rule. The resulting dualism between liberalism
and absolutism made this early constitutional system vulnerable to the
totalitarian and militaristic powers to which it eventually fell victim.
According to Miyazawa, Japan's capitulation in 1945 was the turning
point for Japanese constitutional development. He underscores the fact
that the new Japanese constitution was more than merely a revision of its
predecessor. While the Meji constitution provided for the possibility of
certain revisions it did not permit the abolishment of the imperial system,
which was considered eternal. Thus constitutional change had to be
effected by external factors. Japan's capitulation brought about the end of
the imperial rule and the beginning of an era under the sovereignty of the
Japanese people as entrenched in the new constitution.
This fundamental difference between the two constitutions is evident
in their preambles. The Meii constitution's preamble mirrors the
Emperor's strong position:
By enjoying the Glory which was left behind by My ancestors, and
occupying the throne, which at all times belonged to the same house, I
remember that My beloved subjects are the same to which My ancestors
directed Their love and assistance, wish their well-being may increase and
their ability and capacities may develop and hope to enhance State's
striving for development with their support and participation.
As Heuser and Kazuaki point out, the old constitution considered that
objective rules were orders of the Emperor while (subjective) rights were
seen as his gift to his subjects. Under the new constitution, the Emperor
no longer is the state's personification. His position is reduced to that of
the state's symbol retaining only ceremonial and declaratory functions.
Accordingly, the new Japanese constitution's preamble begins with the
following passage:
We, the Japanese people, acting through our rightfully elected
representatives in Parliament and determined to secure for us and for our
descendants the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all peoples and the
blessings of freedom everywhere on the soil of our country so that never
again the horrors of war result from the actions of the government,
herewith declare that the sovereign powers belong to the people and adopt
this constitution.
This passage puts in a prominent position the two concepts which are the
cornerstones of the 1947 constitution: the achievement of democracy
within Japan, and pacifism as the supreme value in Japan's external
relations. These elements are recurring themes in the chapters of
Miyazawa's book in which he surveys the structure and content of the
constitution.

Constitutional Law (Kempo)

Much attention is devoted to the Charter of Rights in the constitution.
Interestingly, the Charter is much more detailed than many of its western
counterparts. Not only does it include detailed procedural rights but it
also stresses that the citizen's rights are tied to certain duties. The right to
work, for example, entails a corresponding duty to work. Always
drawing on comparative aspects, Miyazawa then surveys elections, the
Emperor's functions and rights, the parliament's and the cabinet's
structure and powers, the court system, and many other aspects of the
Japanese constitution.
Miyazawa's book is an important and interesting addition to the
literature on comparative constitutional law. At the same time, it is a
useful overview for non-specialists and for those interested in Japanese
affairs. Being a well-crafted combination of an introduction to general
constitutional law and a study of the application of general themes to the
case of the Japanese constitution, the book generally dispenses with
references to court decisions and academic debates.
For German readers, Miyazawa's book is of particular interest. The
post-war constitutions of Germany and Japan both share the context of
pre-war constitutional experience and failure, capitulation, external
supervision of the drafting process, and its results. Finally, the
international lawyer will find interesting details on the "internationalist"
outlook of the new Japanese constitution. Not only is pacifism one of its
premises, but the constitution also explicitely states the supremacy of
international law.
All these features, together with a bibliography, a glossary of Japanese
terminology, and annexes containing a German translation of both
constitutions, make Miyazawa Tosbiyosbi's "kempo" highly recommended reading.
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